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Abstract 
Gas flared in association with the production of crude oil began in Nigeria under the British Colonial rule when 
Shell began oil production in 1958, and with the increasing production of oil, the volume of gas flared in the 
process of oil production increased. In Nigeria alone, gas flaring amounts to about 23 billion cubic metres per 
annum of the gas generated in association with crude oil production in over 100 flare sites, constituting over 13 
percent of global gas flaring out of the over 150 billion cubic metres of natural gas flared and vented annually. 
This translates to greenhouse gas emission of 45 million tons of CO2 out of the global total of 400 million tons 
annually. Even as the environmental effect of gas flaring is trans-boundary or global in terms of global warming 
and climate change, it has some negative environmental and health impacts on the immediate or local 
environment. Economically, Nigeria lost about $72 billion in revenue between 1970 and 2006 due to gas flaring; 
and currently, loses about $2.5 billion annually for flaring associated gas. The paradox is that the volume of gas 
flared annually in Nigeria can match the country’s energy need and resolve the energy crisis. Among other 
measures, Nigerian government has set various deadlines for elimination of gas flaring but none of these zero-
gas flaring deadlines has been achieved. The paper concludes that this is due to rentier character of the Nigerian 
state, rentier mentality of the Nigerian rentier (ruling) class and rentierism of the Nigerian economy. 
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1. Introduction 
Gas flared in association with the production of crude oil began in Nigeria under the British Colonial rule when 
Shell began oil production in 1958, and with the increasing production of oil, the volume of gas flared in the 
process of oil production increased (see Appendix I). In Nigeria alone, gas flaring amounts to about 23 billion 
cubic metres per annum of the gas generated in association with crude oil production in over 100 flare sites, 
constituting over 13 percent of global gas flaring out of the over 150 billion cubic metres of natural gas flared 
and vented annually. This translates to greenhouse gas emission of 45 million tons of CO2 out of the global total 
of 400 million tons annually. Consequently, Nigeria lost about $72 billion in revenue between 1970 and 2006 
due to gas flaring. Currently, Nigeria loses about $2.5 billion annually for flaring associated gas (Kaldany, 2006). 
Flaring of associated gas emits a greenhouse gas (GHG) which contributes to global warming and climate 
change with flaring emissions currently estimated at about 400 million tons of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere each year. Globally, flaring and venting of gas in petroleum production, therefore, waste a valuable 
energy resource worth approximately 30.6 billion dollars each year, and harms the environment (GGFR, 2012). 
The paradox is that the volume of gas flared annually in Nigeria can match the country’s energy need and 
resolve the energy crisis (Agboola, Nwulu, Egelioglu and Agboola, 2011). 
Although the environmental effect of gas flaring is trans-boundary or global in terms of global warming 
and climate change, it has some negative effects on the immediate or local environment (Christansen and 
Haugland, 2001). For example, flares contains as many as 250 toxins and flares emit particulate matters 
including sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and carcinogenic substance as well as unburned fuel hydrogen sulfide 
several of which can cause aggravated asthma, cough, chronic bronchitis, decreased lung functions, difficult or 
painful breathing and premature death. Flares create acid rain corrosive to metal roof, acidifies lakes and streams 
and kills vegetation. Ibeanu (2008) also points out that flaring gas within the vicinity of human dwellings is 
conducive to acid rains, and causes devastation of farmland and fishing waters, deforestation and destruction of 
wildlife and as well threatens resource flows and livelihoods (Nwankwo and Ogagarue, 2011). 
By late 1970s and mid-1980s, the Nigerian government in a bid to reduce gas flaring enacted various 
gas re-injection policies or laws that imposed fines on oil majors for the quantity of gas flared during oil 
production. Apart from placing fines on international oil companies (IOCs) for the quantity of gas flared during 
oil production, Nigerian government has set various deadlines for elimination of gas flaring but none of these 
zero-gas flaring deadlines has been achieved. Paradoxically, the revenue Nigerian government generates from oil 
is less than what it loses in gas flaring annually in terms of environmental degradation, waste of energy resource, 
agricultural and human resources (see Appendix II). However, the government is preoccupied with maximizing 
oil revenue at the short term than in making long term commitments toward achieving gas flare-out regime. In 
other words, Nigerian government is not prepared to make short-term sacrifice of losing oil revenues necessary 
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for achieving zero-gas flaring. Consequently, the Nigerian government is only concerned with the immediate 
gain than the future gain (Agboola, et al, 2011; Kingston, 2011). 
Thus, the Nigerian government and its agency in oil sector, NNPC, are much more interested in 
increasing oil export revenue through increased oil production than to drastically peg oil production to the 
capacity of gas utilization facilities while oil multinationals are investing more in oil production to maximize 
profits through increased oil production than investing to increase the capacity of gas utilization facilities. As a 
result Nigeria has only been able to enforce marginal reduction of gas flaring. Thus, the joint venture partners are 
more interested in increasing oil production for more revenues or profits than increasing the capacity of gas 
utilization facilities. The bottomline is that the Nigerian government prioritizes economic diplomacy over 
environmental diplomacy thereby impeding its role in enforcing zero-gas regime.  
The focus of this study therefore is to examine the role of the Nigerian government in enforcing zero-
gas flaring policy. The paper thus argues that due to rentier character of the Nigerian state, rentier mentality of 
the Nigerian rentier (ruling) class and rentierism of the Nigerian economy, the government has not been 
successful in enforcing these deadlines on oil multinationals. To do this, we divided the paper into four main 
parts. The first part is “Introduction” that introduces the paper. The second part describes or discusses the 
theoretical perspective for understanding the inability of the Nigerian government to enforce zero-gas flaring 
policy. The third part is “Gas Flaring Reduction and Elimination Efforts of the Nigerian Government” which 
describes the various efforts of the Nigerian government in enforcing gas flare out regime. This second part is 
subdivided into four parts: (i) Nigerian Government and the Legal Frameworks for Enforcing Gas Flaring 
Reduction and Elimination; (ii) Nigerian Government and Provision of Incentives for Gas Flaring Reduction and 
Elimination; (iii) Economic Diplomacy versus Environmental Diplomacy and the Role of the Nigerian 
Government in the International Initiatives for Gas Flaring and Climate Change Mitigation; and (iv) Nigerian 
Government, Rentierism and Zero-Gas Flaring Deadlines. Finally, the fourth part is “Conclusion” which 
summarizes the paper and makes recommendations on the basis of findings.  
 
2. Theoretical Discourse 
This study is essentially predicated on the theory of the rentier state. According to Beblawi and Luciani (1987), a 
rentier state is a term used to classify those states which derive all or a substantial portion of their revenues from 
the rent of indigenous resources to external clients and the creating in the same process a rentier mentality and a 
rentier class in these states. For Mahdavy (1970), rentier states are usually blessed with abundant mineral 
resources like oil and gas, and therefore, rely essentially on rent seeking, that is, earning of income by capturing 
economic rent through manipulation or exploitation, rather than by earning profits through economic 
transactions and production of added wealth.  
The theory of rentier state states that countries that receive substantial amounts of oil revenues from the 
outside world on a regular basis tend to become autonomous from their societies, unaccountable to their citizens 
and in fact autocratic. The theory is, therefore, used to explain why Iran and other Gulf states and some African 
states like Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, etc, with abundant resource wealth perform less well than their resource poor 
counterparts (Schwarz, 2007). Thus, Mahdavy (1970) wonders why the oil exporting countries are not among the 
fastest growing economies of the world in spite of the extraordinary resources that are available to them. He 
further observes that there is a complacent attitude among the rentier states which contrasted vividly with the 
sense of alarm and urgency prevalent in most other underdeveloped countries with massive impoverishment of 
the general populace and general backwardness. According to Mahdavy (1970): 
 Whereas in most underdeveloped countries, this kind of relative regression will normally lead to 
public alarm and some kind of political explosion aimed at changing the status quo… in a rentier 
state, the welfare and prosperity imported from abroad preempts some of the urgency for change 
and rapid growth, and may in fact coincide with socio-political stagnation and inertia.  
Mahdavy (1970), further, notes that rentier economies are like other monoproducers, highly vulnerable to 
external price shocks and rather than diversifying their economies, most rentier states waited out the crash by 
implementing austerity measures. According to him, therefore: 
However one looks at them the oil revenues received by the government of the oil exporting 
countries have very little to do with the production processes of their domestic economies. Input 
from local industries, including wages and salaries, payment to local contractors and purchase of 
local supplies is so insignificant that for all practical purposes one can consider the oil revenues as 
a free gift of nature… As a result, the petroleum industries in the oil rentier states tend to be 
enclave industries that generate few backward or forward linkages. 
Beblawi (1990), however, delineates four basic characteristics of a rentier state which are (a) rent 
situations must predominate in that there is no such thing as a pure rentier economy (b) the rent must come from 
abroad or outside the country (c) in a rentier state only the few (i.e. the rentier class) are engaged in the 
generation of rent while the majority is involved in its distribution and consumption meaning that the 
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government functionaries or political leaders (i.e. rentier class) make the deals and take in the revenue, and then 
allocate to the public that is not involved in creation of wealth and (d) the government must be the principal 
recipient of the external rent in the economy meaning that the rents accrue to the government directly. 
The implications of the above characterization is that rentierism often transforms rentier states into 
mono-product or mono-cultural economies where (i) the little productive activities are mainly confined at the 
level of primary production necessary for oil exploration (ii) there is predominance of public sector over private 
sector (iii) there is in the private sector the dominance of informal sector over formal sector. Beblawi (1990), 
thus, notes that the above state of affairs creates a “rentier mentality”. He describes rentier mentality as:  
A psychological condition with profound consequences for productivity where contracts are 
given as an expression of gratitude rather than as a reflection of economic rationale; civil servants 
see their principal duty as being available in their offices during working hours, businessmen 
abandon industry… the best and brightest abandon business and seek out lucrative government 
employment; manual labour and other work considered demeaning by the rentier is farmed out to 
foreign workers whose remittances flood  out of the rentier economy. 
Furthermore, Beblawi (1990), identities several other characteristics particularly associated with 
“rentier” oil states. For example, where the government is the largest and ultimate employer of labour, the 
bureaucracy is frequently bloated, ineffective and inefficient because jobs are given mainly for patronage 
purposes and political reasons. Similarly, Ifesinachi (2007) following Moore (2004) observes that in a rentier 
state there exists little incentive to establish efficient public meritocratic bureaucracy, because the task of raising 
revenue from mineral resources requires few specialists and these may be imported. In addition, local laws often 
make it impossible for foreign companies to operate independently. This leads to a situation where citizenship 
becomes a financial asset. In order to do business, foreign enterprises engage a local “sponsor” who allows the 
company to trade in his name in return for a proportion of the proceeds (Herb, 2002). 
In the same vein, Luciani (1990) notes that rentierism is linked to the emergency of weak states in 
which a high level of rentierism will negatively affect the function of the modern state to represent its citizens or 
perform her representation function. Rentierism transforms a rent-seeking state into an allocation or a 
distributive state, instead of being a production state (Anderson, 1987). A production state relies on taxation of 
the domestic economy for its income while an allocation state does not depend on domestic sources of revenue, 
because external rents liberate it from the need to extract income from the domestic economy (Khouri, 2008). 
However, by liberating itself from the necessity of tax collection, the rentier state unwittingly 
diminishes its own administrative capacity (Feldman, 2003). In other words, so long as the ‘prosperity’ of the 
rentier state derives from external rent, technological and organizational improvements will remain 
underdeveloped and real economic development illusory (Smith, 2004). Consequently, Beblawi and Luciani 
(1987) notes that since the government in a rentier economy distributes benefits; the opposition, rather than 
focusing its attention on the underlying rentier state dysfunction, rattles on about how benefits are distributed 
(Moore, 2004). 
The Nigerian state is, indeed, a rent-seeking state relying on oil revenue received from rents or royalties 
paid by oil and gas multinationals in their exploration and exploitation of oil and gas in Nigeria. For instance, oil 
and gas constitute nearly 90% of Nigerian revenue and foreign exchange earnings showing that Nigeria is a 
mono-product or mono-cultural economy where oil is the mainstay of the economy. Rents, therefore, 
predominate in Nigeria. Thus, the Nigerian state satisfies all the characteristics enumerated by Hazim Beblawi, 
which qualifies it to be referred to as a rentier state, specifically a rentier-oil state. In Nigeria, for example, rents 
or royalties accrue directly to the Nigerian state and only few, that is, the government functionaries are engaged 
in its generation, the rest are involved in its distribution. The implication of the above is that the Nigerian state is 
an allocation or a distributive state, and not a production state. Even the few productive activities in Nigeria are 
confined to the level of primary production, specifically exploration and production of oil and gas (i.e. upstream 
oil sub-sector) by the oil and gas multinationals. 
Therefore, the analytical utility and usefulness of rentierism in this study stem from the fact that it more 
than any other theory captures the very essence of the political economy of non-enforcement of gas flare-out 
regime in Nigeria, and as well the fundamental and primary concerns of the joint venture partners like the 
Nigerian government represented by NNPC and oil multinationals. Rentier state theory has high analytical value 
in that it is adequate and apt for explaining the three major issues raised in this study. These three major issues 
are captured by the four main contradictions of the joint venture partners in Nigeria as identified by rentier state 
theory such as (a) contradiction between rents or revenues and environment, (b) conflict between profits and 
environment, (c) tension between national security and environmental security, and (d) contradiction between 
increase in oil production and efficient utilization of natural resources. In summary, there is conflict between 
economic diplomacy and environmental diplomacy.  
For example, contradiction between rents and environment, conflict between profits and environment, 
contradiction between increased oil production and efficient utilization of natural resources, and tension between 
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national security and environmental security or security of the local population living in the immediate 
environment explain the reason why explain the reason why the Nigerian state is concerned for increase in oil 
production and revenues more than the environmental harmful effects of gas flaring to the immediate 
environment in the Niger Delta. Due to the rentierism or rentier character of the Nigerian state and the associated 
rentier mentality of the Nigeria’s rentier class, Nigeria places premium on collection of oil revenues accruing as 
rents or royalties more than on protecting the environment of oil communities in the Niger-Delta. The import of 
this is that a country that depends largely on oil revenue to offset its expenditure cannot in all sincerity enforce 
zero-gas flaring deadline in oil and gas multinationals. The major concern of the Nigerian state is to increase oil 
revenues through higher oil production without recourse to the capacity of associated gas gathering facility at the 
expense of oil communities. The Nigerian government and its agencies in oil sector, NNPC, are much more 
interested in increasing oil export revenue through increase oil production than to drastically peg oil production 
to the capacity of associated gas utilization facilities or fund available to meet the flare-out target.  
From the foregoing therefore rentier state theory is able to make us understand that the fundamental 
concerns of the joint venture partners is increase in crude oil production though for different reasons. For 
examples, the reason for Nigerian state and its agency, NNPC, is increase in oil revenues defined as national 
security. Finally, for oil multinationals in Nigeria, the reason is to increase or maximize profits. Under this state 
of affairs, achieving zero-gas flaring becomes rhetoric and as such secondary. 
 
3. Gas Flaring Reduction and Elimination Efforts of the Nigerian Government  
Most of the crude oil reserves in Nigeria are mixed with natural gas and produced in association with gas. Not 
surprisingly, the exploration and production of natural gas in Nigeria was accidental to the production of crude 
oil in 1958 under the British colonial rule. Most of these volumes of gas, though insignificant, were flared. All 
available data show that gas production; utilization and flaring have increased since then at least in absolute 
terms. In other words, Nigerian government has been able to reduce gas flaring in relative terms but not absolute 
terms. For details, see Appendix III and Table 1 below. It is not as if the inability of the Nigerian government to 
stop gas flaring in Nigeria is because of lack of trying. Nigerian government has made several efforts to reduce 
and eliminate gas flaring since 1969 to no avail. Some of these efforts include legal and regulatory frameworks, 
fiscal and economic incentives, international engagements and initiatives, and setting of zero-gas flaring 
deadlines. We subsequently discussed these measures in different sub-headings below. 
 
3.1. Nigerian Government and the Legal Frameworks for Enforcing Gas Flaring Reduction and 
Elimination  
Nigerian government had enacted several laws for curbing gas flaring namely the 1969 (Drilling and Production) 
Regulation, the 1973 Petroleum Amendment Decree, the 1979 Associated Gas Re-injection Act, the 1983 
Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act, the 1985 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Decree, the 
2004 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act, and finally, the 2010 Associated Gas Re-injection Bill. Yet 
gas  flaring by oil multinationals continue in spite of these gas flaring regulatory regimes, either because the laws 
are defective or that they are not properly implemented or enforced (Christiansen and Haugland, 2001; Ibikunle, 
2006; Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Ogbara, 2009; Buzcu-Guven, Harriss and Hertzmark, 2010; Oluduro, 
2011; Ukala, 2011). 
The 1969 Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation Decree No. 51 provides that licencee or 
leasee must submit feasibility study, programme or proposal for gas utilization not later than five years after the 
commencement of production. But the decree failed to provide adequate penalty for violation. In fact, the 1969 
Regulation does not carry any penalty clause as it allows the producers to flare gas for five years before 
feasibility study. In spite of this, the oil majors operating in Nigeria were not able to meet up or comply. Nigerian 
government on their part was not able to enforce the regulation as the law made no provisions for sanctions 
against non-compliance. The 1969 Regulation was thus inherently defective or flawed (Ibikunle, 2006; 
Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Oluduro, 2011; Ukala, 2011). While under the 1973 Petroleum (Amendment) 
Decree, the government may take gas flare at no cost. Yet absence of infrastructure to develop and utilize the 
produced gas resulted to non-compliance.  
The 1979 Associated Gas Re-injection Decree No. 99 required oil companies to submit proposals or 
detailed plan for gas utilization or re-injecting gas into the earth crust, and empowers the Minister of Petroleum 
Resources to grant permission to flare on certain  conditions. Thus, no company without facilities for associated 
gas utilization shall be permitted to engage in oil production unless issued certificate of permission by the 
Minister as from January 1, 1984.   The decree set the limit of October to April 1980 for the oil companies to 
develop gas utilization projects and to stop gas flaring by 1984, or face fines, for example, acreage may be 
forfeited for violation (Ainablankson Newsletter, April 2011).  
However, major oil companies in Nigeria indicated difficulties in meeting the 1984 deadlines citing lack 
of finance to construct a gas re-injection plant within the time frame. Consequently, the deadline was extended 
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by one year, yet oil companies failed to adhere to the provisions or stipulations claiming that it was too 
expensive to re-inject gas. As such, approximately 55 percent of oil fields were exempted from participating in 
gas re-injection with issuance of certificate of permission from the Ministry at an insignificant fee. The 1979 
Associated Gas Flaring Re-injection Decree allowed the Minister to permit gas flaring for a period of thirty days 
in the cases of start-up equipment failure or shut down without having to pay for such gas flared (Ibikunle, 2006; 
Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Oluduro, 2011; Ukala, 2011).  
The 1983 Associated Gas Re-injection Amendment Act introduced specific penalty for the first time and 
extended the deadline by one year. Although penalty existed it was not sufficient to serve as a deterrent. The 
1985 Associated Gas Re-injection Amendment Decree 7 permits a company engaged in the production of oil or 
gas to continue to flare gas in a particular field(s) on the payment of a fee prescribed by the Minister on issuance 
of certificate stating that gas utilization or re-injection was inappropriate for the field in question. The decree 
fixed a fine of 2 Kobo equivalent of $0.0009) for each 1000 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas flared at the fields 
where permission to flare was not granted. In 1990, the penalty was increased to 50 Kobo or N0.50 Naira per 
1000 standard feet of gas flared. In 1998, this penalty was increased twenty-fold from 50 Kobo (0.50 Naira) to 
10 Naira (about $11) for every 1000 standard cubic feet of gas flared. These penalties were generally considered 
too meager or insignificant to serve as a deterrent to oil companies to reduce or stop gas flaring. Even at that it 
was not quite clear whether the government’s motive was to end flaring or raise revenue (Ibikunle, 2006; 
Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Oluduro, 2011; Ukala, 2011). 
The 2004 Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act made it compulsory for all companies 
operating in Nigeria to submit their detailed plans for utilization of gas produced and retains most of the 
provisions of earlier laws like prohibition of flaring associated gas without written permission of the Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources. The major difference was that it turned the decrees into Act of parliament. In 2005, the oil 
companies paid a paltry $19.8 million as penalty for gas flaring yet they prefer to flare gas and pay the scanty 
fines at huge environmental costs to oil bearing communities that are most affected by the impacts. Thus, the oil 
companies would rather pay than make the investments needed to stop indiscriminate gas flaring. Owing to this, 
the gas flare penalty was increased to $3.50 in 2008 for every 1000 standard cubic feet of associated gas flared. 
In January 2010, the House of Representatives fixed December 31, 2012 as the terminal date of gas flaring in 
Nigeria in the bill awaiting enactment (Ibikunle, 2006; Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Oluduro, 2011; Ukala, 
2011).  
Currently, two important bills are at the National Assembly, namely, 2008 Associated Gas Re-injection 
(Amendment) Bill and 2009 Gas Flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill. The 2008 Associated Gas Re-
injection (Amendment) Bill seeks to extend the deadline for flaring of associated gas to December 31, 2008 and 
to impose a fine of 410 Naira (about $3.00) per standard cubic feet of gas flared. While the 2009 Gas Flaring 
(Prohibition and Punishment) Bill seeks to prohibit or forbid flaring of both associated and non-associated gas 
and makes the penalty equal to what is applicable in the international market, and applicable fine shall not be 
regarded as part of joint ventures (JVs) obligations. Under this proposed law, oil companies are required to report 
all emergency gas flaring within 24 hours of occurrence, failure of which will attract fine of US $500,000. The 
Bill further provides that any company that declares an incorrect volume of flared gas shall be liable to a fine of 
US $100,000 and must pay the difference of such wrongly declared volumes at the prevailing international gas 
market rate (Oluduro, 2011). This is because of the tendency for oil multinationals to falsify or under report gas 
flare volume due to lack of metering and monitoring in order to underpay gas flaring fines or penalty. 
According to the Section 3 (1) of the 2009 Gas flaring (Prohibition and Punishment) Bill: “No 
Company engaged in the production of oil and gas shall after December 31, 2012 flare gas produced in 
association with oil, other than such minimum allowed by the Minister by regulation”. Section 3 (2) (b) of the 
Bill permits the Minister to grant a temporary gas flaring permit to any company which seeks to continue to flare 
gas in particular field (s) on payment of the sum of $5.00 per 1000 standard cubic feet of gas flared with a 
processing fee of $1000. A temporary gas penalty is payable for any gas flared in excess of approved gas 
volumes during pre-commissioning and commissioning operations, equipment, maintenance  and operation upset. 
But under the JV arrangements, the gas flare penalty being levied by government is more or less 
tantamount to government or NNPC paying itself, which becomes an incentive rather than disincentive for 
flaring. It is like giving with one hand and taking with the other hand leaving nothing to the oil communities 
whose environment is being devastated. There is as well allegation or accusation of under reporting of gas flare 
volumes and under payment of a gas flare penalty by oil multinationals and even allegation of inaccurate gas 
flaring data in Nigeria. This is demonstrated by irregularities in gas flare penalty payment as audited by NEITI. 
More importantly, the gas flare fine is still too low to deter oil multinationals operated JVs from gas 
flaring. Even the approximately $3 million per month of fines that the Nigerian government receives is just a 
fraction of what it could impose. The reasons fines are not increased is that Nigerian government owes a big debt 
to oil multinationals operating JVs as part of it cash calls obligations or share of its participation interest in JVs. 
The government cannot actually collect most of the fines for gas flaring since it has failed to redeem its own 
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obligation. Thus, oil multinationals complain that budget constraint and consequent delays to schedule are 
putting pressure on the flare down and out programmes (Okubote, 2001; Ishisone, 2004). 
 
3.2. Nigerian Government and Provision of Incentives for Gas Flaring Reduction and Elimination 
In realizing that penalties and fines alone cannot deter oil firms from flaring associated gas, the Nigerian 
government introduced a number of legal and economic incentives to encourage oil companies to improve upon 
utilization of associated gas rather than flaring it. Some of these gas incentives are covered under the following 
Agreements and Acts, namely; Associated Gas Framework Agreement (AGFA) 1992; Financial (Miscellaneous 
Taxation Provision) Act 1998; Financial (Miscellaneous Taxation Provision) Act 1999; and Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas (NLNG) Act 1990 (Ibikunle, 2006). 
The Associated Gas Framework Agreement (AGFA) was introduced in 1991/1992 as a fiscal incentive 
for natural gas utilization. AGFA involved broad-based packages such as processing, production, transmission 
and supply of gas to the NLNG. The Fiscal Incentive Guarantee and Assurance Decree (FIGAD) 30 of 1990 was 
meant to hasten or quicken the development of the NLNG project. It exempts oil and gas companies involved in 
the NLNG project from import duties and export charges and as well grants them tax holidays (Bankole, 2001; 
Aghalino, 2009). 
The Associated Gas Utilization Fiscal Incentives (AGUFI) was introduced as economic incentives for 
investments in gas-to-liquid projects and for oil firms dedicated to enhancing utilization of gas resources. For 
example, in January 1998, the Nigerian government decides to cut income taxes for gas projects from 85 percent 
to 35 percent. Gas projects would henceforth be treated under usual company income tax rates instead of the 
higher tax rates applicable to income from oil production. For integrated oil and gas projects, oil operation is to 
be separated from gas operation (Christiansen and Haugland, 2001). 
The Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Act 1990 provided incentives covering projects such as 
LNG, GTL, IPPs, etc. The NLNG Act of 1990 provides for tax free period of 3 to 5 years or 10 years specifically 
for NLNG and as well allows for the quick recovery of investment. While the Financial (Miscellaneous Taxation 
Provision) Acts if 1998 and 1999 provides for reduction in tax rate and investment tax credit/allowance. Other 
fiscal incentives include a value-added tax (VAT) and customs-duty exemption on plant machinery and 
equipment; import duty reduction on construction materials;  a five-year tax holiday; an accelerated tax capital 
allowance after the tax free period in the form of 90% with 10% retention on the books for investments in plant 
and machinery; guarantee export earnings to cover offshore  obligations; a 15 percent investment capital 
allowance that shall not reduce the value of the asset; hundred percent ownership or equity holding; tax-free 
dividends during the tax-free period; and tax-deductible interest on loans for associated gas utilization projects 
(Okopido, 2002; Ibikunle; 2006; Buzcu-Guven, Hariss and Hertzmark, 2010). 
Recently, Nigerian government has constituted a technical committee on the implementation of the 
downstream natural gas sector reform meant to stimulate investment in utilization of associated gas. The term of 
reference of the Committee is to work out details and run checks on the Natural Gas Draft Bill (NGDB) which is 
currently under deliberation in the National Assembly. The Committee will also include critical examination of 
the sections of the bill that relate to taxes and fiscal terms, and advise government on the best options for the 
industry to be fast tracked. Other legislations in the process include the Downstream Gas Act (DGA) which 
would be aimed at liberalization of the gas sector with a view to ensuring a level playground for investment. It 
has already been received by Federal Executive Council (FEC) and has been forwarded to the National 
Assembly for consideration (Malumfashi, 2007). 
In addition to legal and fiscal incentives, the Nigerian government has established some institutions to 
stimulate and coordinate gas development in the country. Some of these institutions include Nigerian Gas 
Company as a subsidiary of the NNPC with responsibility for gas gathering and transmission in the country. 
There is also a gas division in NNPC with responsibility for coordinating gas investment and management 
arrangements (Etete, 1995; Aghalino; 2009). 
More recently, the Nigerian government has produced a Gas Master Plan in 2007 that is aimed largely 
at promoting or encouraging domestic use of natural gas for cooking and power sector as a means to end flaring. 
It also aims to complement power sector reform with increased domestic gas prices to create improved 
incentives to natural gas producers. It is believed that this Plan will double domestic gas utilization. The Plan 
also aims at better utilization of existing gas transmission capacity by the international oil companies (IOCs) 
operating in Nigeria. The Gas Sector Plan is as well aimed at creating a more secure and viable transactional 
environment for gas sales to domestic buyers and users (Buzcu-Guven, Harriss and Hertzmark, 2010). Nigerian 
government has through Gas Master Plan formulated gas pricing policy, domestic gas supply obligation and gas 
infrastructure blueprint or gas supply and distribution national grid (Ukpohor, 2011). 
The aspirations of the Nigerian government in the Gas Master Plan are; one, to enhance the 
development of the domestic gas market and facilitate the growth of the power and industrial sectors; provide an 
enabling environment for the entry of  new investors and increased private sector participation in gas sector, 
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address environmental issues and end gas flaring; capture economic value of gas through domestic and export 
projects; generate as much revenue from gas as oil within the decade; and diversify from an oil industry to an 
integrated oil and gas industry (Ibikunle, 2006; Okopido, 2007).  
Earlier in 1999/2000, the Nigerian government initiated a study which identified the following options 
to fast track gas development such as concentrating on gas export drive mainly LNG in view of its growing 
international demands; stimulates domestic demand through the development of power sector and reviewing 
dormant gas utilization centres or projects like steel plants, cement plants, aluminum plants, power plants and 
fertilizer plants. Nigerian government is also trying to revive the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) market and 
make them available and affordable as a step towards discouraging the use of firewood necessary for slowing 
down the process of desertification (Ibikunle, 2006; Okopido, 2007).  
In order to cope with the anticipated increase in domestic gas requirements due to expansion in existing 
gas infrastructure, the Nigerian government is constructing another pipeline extension from Ajaokuta to Obajana 
Cement Factory and new set of pipelines for the new power plants. Still under the Nigerian Gas Master Plan, 
government is encouraging the manufacturing sector to switch over from less efficient fuels such as LPFO and 
diesel to cleaner, more efficient and cheaper natural gas. The Nigerian government is also looking at the use of 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) for automobiles as an alternative to the use of diesel and petrol. In order to 
achieve this, government has slated existing and proposed gas distribution zones under franchise with Nigeria 
Gas Company (NGC) such as Agbara industrial Area to Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG); Greater Lagos Area to Gaslink 
Nigeria Limited; Ikorodu Industrial Area to Falcon Nigeria Limited, and Epe-Lekki Area to Gasland Nigeria 
Limited (Ibikunle, 2006; Okopido, 2007). 
Gaslink, which supplies natural gas to nearly thirty industrial customers in Ikeja Industrial District, 
Lagos, planned to include 150 industrial customers, 250,000 residential/commercial customers and 25 
independent power producers. Other Several distribution schemes are being proposed by the Nigerian 
government to help promote domestic consumption of gas in Nigeria such as the proposed $580 million 
Ajaokuta-Abuja-Kaduna Pipeline to supply natural gas to Central and Northern Nigeria (Aghalino, 2009). 
Nigerian government also rolled out a catalogue of very robust and attractive investment opportunities 
in the gas sector like gas gathering transmission and distribution; utilization of gas as fuel for industries and 
power generation; distribution of gas as domestic fuel; natural gas vehicles filling plants and conversion kits; 
production of LPG, etc; gas to liquid plants; manufacturing of gas-fired appliances, pipes and vessels; and 
building new LNG plants for gas export (Okopido, 2007). However, despite these efforts, aspirations and 
projections, Nigeria was not able to meet these targets and projections in growing gas demand, stimulating gas 
sector investments, among others (see Appendix IV). Consequently, the various zero-gas flaring deadlines were 
not achieved.  
 
3.3. Economic Versus Environmental Diplomacy and the Role of the Nigerian Government in the 
International Initiatives for Gas Flaring and Climate Change Mitigation  
Nigerian government has been involved in numerous international engagements, agreements and initiatives for 
mitigation of gas flaring, carbon emissions, global warming, and climate change. Some of these international 
initiatives for gas flaring and climate mitigation include the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC); Kyoto Protocol; World Bank Carbon Credit Finance; Global Gas Flaring Reduction 
Partnership (GGFRP); Convention on Biological Diversity; the Ramsar Convention; the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, and various bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with other countries (Christiansen and Haugland, 2001; Aghalino, 2009; Buzcu-Guven, Harriss and 
Hertzmark, 2010; Oluduro, 2011). 
Nigeria is signatory to the Convention in Biological Diversity (CBD) of 1992, the Ramsar Convention, 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES, 1973). Nigeria 
signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992. Nigeria also ratified 
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol aims at strengthening the international response to climate change and promoting the 
ultimate objective of UNFCCC. Consequent upon this ratification, Nigeria as a non-Annex I country, is eligible 
to host Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects that can earn it revenue from the sale of carbon credits. 
The Federal Ministry of Environment (FME) is one of the relevant authorities for CDM in Nigeria, mainly 
involved in the broader policy at national level (ICF International, 2006).  
Recently, the Nigerian government introduced another authority or body called the Presidential 
Implementation Committee on CDM (PIC CDM) as the body to organize CDM activities in Nigeria. Also, the 
PIC CDM has been named the Designated National Authority (DNA) as required by the UNFCCC and as 
defined in the Marrakech Accords. In this capacity, the PIC CDM has complete responsibility for CDM activities, 
especially in areas where government intervention and activities are expected. Thus, the DNA is expected among 
other things to promote CDM projects in Nigeria; provide clear and flexible procedures for review and approval 
of CDM projects; provide documentation and communication portals that give clear information to project 
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proponents and investors (both buyers of Certified Emission Reduction CERs and/or financials of the project) on 
the necessary steps or procedures to have an approved CDM project in Nigeria; provide clear guidance on 
national sustainability criteria that should be taken into consideration in developing CDM projects; write Letters 
of Approval (LoA) for  projects being sent to Executive Board for review and other CDM project cycle activities, 
after the DNA must have carried out some reviews of the proposed CDM project; and keep a registry of CDM 
projects in the pipeline in Nigeria (ICF International, 2006). 
In the case of green financing, Nigeria engages with the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) for 
funding of gas sector and energy projects. The GEF is the interim mechanism of the UNFCCC. Although Nigeria 
is eligible for GEF funds, it must compete not only with other developing countries but with projects in other 
core areas. In March 1998, US$2.75 billion was committed to the replenishment of the GEF as a whole. Yet from 
1991 to 1998, climate change projects accounted for only 38 percent of all GEF projects. It is noteworthy to state 
here that GEF funding can only be used for the incremental cost of changes to existing projects or planned 
(baseline) activities in order to make the revised activities benefit the global environment(Christiansen and 
Haugland, 2001).  
In this case, only the incremental cost involved in carrying out or planning a project in order to make it 
reduce GHG emissions would receive the funding. Thus, GEF is unlikely to play any noticeable role for the 
market penetration of associated gas in Nigeria. The only large GEF project related to gas flaring was considered 
in the mid-1990s which passed all the GEF criteria for approval. The GEF grant approved precisely in 1995 to 
the Escravos Gas project for US$ 20 million was meant to make up for revenue losses the Nigerian government 
would suffer as a consequence of tax breaks being offered to the project investors, but was later withdrawn 
(Christiansen and Haugland, 2001). For information on GEF grants to Nigeria see Table 2 below. 
However, none of these projects in the above table, partly or fully, financed by GEF in Nigeria is 
directly related to gas flaring mitigation though related to climate change mitigation except the Nigeria National 
Energy Development Project that is indirectly related to associated gas flaring reduction.  
Nigerian government is also involved in the bilateral and multilateral international engagement with 
other countries to facilitate gas flaring reduction through market access for gas distribution. For example, on 
August 11,1999, the Nigerian government engaged the government of the Benin Republic and Ghana in a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed with a consortium of companies consisting of Chevron, Ghana 
National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), SPDC, Solbagaz 
and Sotgaz for the development of West Africa Gas Project under the Joint  Development Zone (JDZ) in which 
Nigerian government lent Ghana and Sao Tome and Principe a certain sum of money in 2006. Another effort at 
regional cooperation is the one in which Nigeria engaged Algeria is the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline being 
proposed to convey natural gas from Nigeria to Europe through Algeria. Also, Nigeria engaged Equatorial 
Guinea in a proposed gas pipeline to supply 600 mmscf per day of gas by 2009. These proposed gas pipelines 
projects are yet to see the light of the day (Ibikunle, 2006; Aghalino, 2009). 
As such on August 11, 1999, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) spearheaded by Nigerian 
government was signed by participating countries, namely, Nigeria, Ghana, Togo and Benin. In February 2000, 
an Inter-Governmental Agreement was signed by governments of these countries. The West African Gas pipeline 
will transport natural gas from the Lagos terminal in Nigeria to three delivery points in Cotonou (Benin), Lome 
(Togo) and Tema (Ghana) over a distance of 681 km. The pipeline construction and operations obtained financial 
guarantees of the World Bank. The total project cost around $974 million of which the World Bank guarantee for 
Ghana was $80 million while the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provided a $75 million 
political risk guarantee for WAGPCo (Ukpohor, 2011). 
Nigerian government is also engaging World Bank in its efforts to reduce and eliminate gas flaring. 
World Bank happens to be managing over $1 billion funds for carbon purchase. Subsequently, in June 28, 2005, 
the World Bank approved a credit for the National Energy Development Project in Nigeria. The project 
facilitates preparatory work required to launch the main domestic transmission gas pipeline from the South to the 
North of Nigeria and related gas-to-power generator projects. Since then, World Bank has been assisting Nigeria 
directly and indirectly in gas flaring reduction. Apart from carbon financing, the World Bank assisted Nigeria in 
drafting its National Gas Master Plan and Natural Gas Strategy Study, Downstream Gas Bill and Fiscal Regime 
for Gas Bill (Ibikunle, 2006). For information on World Bank carbon financing to Nigeria see Table 3 below. 
Nigeria is one of the partners of the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFRP) set up in 2002 
following the collaboration of Norwegian government and World Bank at a conference titled World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. Nigerian government has been collaborating with the 
GGFR in its efforts to achieve gas flare out. These collaborations are in the areas of domestic gas sector policy; 
integration of operator plans; gas to power sector reform and implementation of the gas to power franchise 
model; financing of common infrastructure projects; small scale gas utilization; and use of CDM to obtain 
carbon credits for flare reduction projects. The GGFR has been involved in the preparation of Nigeria Gas 
Master Plan and Energy Sector Reform which include economic and financial viability of the gas pipelines. 
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GGFR is also assisting Nigeria in carrying out gas pipeline engineering study and support to the implementation 
of the legal and regulatory framework for the gas sector and energy pricing study (World Bank, 2011). 
As part of the larger effort to assist Nigeria in its efforts to reduce gas flaring and venting, the GGFR 
hosted a workshop in Nigeria, first of a series. The key aim of the workshop was to support the designing of 
financial mechanisms for gas flaring reduction projects including assisting Nigeria in obtaining carbon credit 
financing. The workshop helped build CDM capacity among project developers and national authorities leading 
to a viable pilot project. Already two projects benefited from CDM through GGFR partnership. For example, 
Kwale-Okpai IPP utilizes associated gas from five fields for power generation with a capacity of 480 megawatts 
using 140 mmscf/d, while Afam IPP with a capacity of 650 MW utilizes 190 mmscf/day. Another project that 
may be considered is Obiafu-Obrikom Gas injection project involving the reinjection of between 270-350 
mmscf/d with a potential to delay the release of the equivalence of 2.46 million tons of CO2/year to the 
atmosphere (Ibikunle, 2006). For information on GGFR’s flaring reduction demonstration projects from carbon 
finance in Nigeria, see Table 4 below. 
Nigeria is one of the GGFR partners that has endorsed a voluntary standard to eliminate venting and 
reduce flaring significantly within five to ten years by finding commercial uses for the associated gas through 
increased collaboration between countries. The Standard’s initial goal for flaring and venting is “no continuous 
flaring and venting of associated gas, unless there are no feasible alternatives”. Today, the Nigerian government 
is implementing the GGFR’s voluntary standard for reducing global gas flaring and venting with the goal of 
reducing barriers to the utilization of associated gas through markets and infrastructure, commercialization of 
associated gas, strengthening of regulations, and trading of carbon credits (Buscu-Guven, Harriss and Hartzmark, 
2010).  
The voluntary standard recommends consistent use of mass and energy balances to estimate gas flare 
and vent volumes in the existing wells, and the installation of flow metres in newly developed wells and in 
existing facilities with large flare volumes. The GGFR also recommends continuous metering of the gas volume 
flared at the source or flare gas burners and the measurement of associated gas composition and heating values 
essential to determining green gas emission rates (Buscu-Guven, Harriss and Hartzmark, 2010).  
 
3.4. Nigerian Government, Rentierism and Zero-Gas Flaring Deadlines  
Nigerian government has been setting gas flare out deadlines, but to no avail. The first attempt by Nigerian 
government to impose gas flare out regime was in the 1979 Associated Gas Reinjection Decree No. 99 which 
mandated oil companies to stop gas flaring in 1984, or face fines, or forfeits acreage for violation. But oil majors 
in Nigeria indicated difficulties in meeting the 1984 deadline citing lack of finance to construct a gas re-injection 
plant within the timeframe. As a result the deadline was extended to 1985, yet oil companies failed to adhere to 
the provisions claiming it was too expensive to re-inject gas. More importantly, the 1979 Associated Gas Re-
injection Decree No. 99 backing the 1984 and 1985 deadlines for gas flaring was flawed by its provision of 
certificate of permission from the Federal Ministry of Environment to exempt oil fields for a fee (Ibikunle, 2006; 
Malumfashi, 2007; Aghalino, 2009; Oluduro, 2011; Ukala, 2011). 
In 1999, on the return of Nigerian government to civilian administration, it announced that all oil firms 
should end gas flaring by 2003 which was later extended to 2004. In response to this, oil multinationals rejected 
the 2004 zero-gas flaring deadline as unrealistic and blamed government for not consulting them in setting the 
deadline. On its part, Shell announced that it would eliminate gas flaring from its oil fields in 2008. Again, the 
Nigerian government was persuaded and dropped the 2004 deadline for 2008 deadline recommended by oil 
multinationals. Once again, the 2008 deadline reached with the understanding with oil companies, was not 
backed by any new legislation or formal regulation. Not being legally binding the deadline was made vulnerable 
to violation (Social Development Integrated Centre, 2009). 
Not surprisingly, in 2005, Shell announced to members of the Nigerian Senate that the 2008 deadline is 
no longer realistic as it now set its target for 2009. By 2008, Nigerian government was a bundle of contradiction 
as the President and members of the Federal Executive Council (FEC) could not agree on whether the deadline 
was for January or December of the same year (Social Development Integrated centre, 2009). Since then the 
Nigerian government has been shifting zero-gas flaring deadlines, for examples, from 2009 to 2011 and from 
2011 to 2012, and thus, gas flaring continues in Nigeria. 
In spite of all these efforts by Nigerian government, oil multinationals in joint ventures with NNPC 
continue to flare gas in oil fields, and there is nothing on the ground to suggest that they will end gas flaring soon. 
In other words, the oil multinationals are still flaring associated gas in Nigeria and have consistently failed to 
comply with the zero-gas flaring deadline in Nigeria leading to perpetual shift in zero-gas flaring deadlines from 
2003 to 2004 to 2008 to 2009 to 2011 to 2012. The consequence is that zero-gas flaring in Nigeria has remained 
elusive as the government has  
been setting new deadlines every year to completely stop flaring. However, the government has not 
been successful in enforcing these deadlines on oil multinationals. The point is that the Nigerian government has 
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not been completely committed and sincere in ensuring compliance by oil multinationals for fear of losing oil 
revenues. A serious government would have pegged oil production to the capacity of gas utilization even if it 
means reduction in oil production and loss of revenues. Thus, Aghalino (2009) states that it is puzzling that in 
spite of the measures that have been taken by the Nigerian government to stop gas flaring, oil firms continue to 
flare gas in its various oil fields in Nigeria. For details, see Table 5 below.  
Perhaps, this lies in the rentier character of the Nigerian state or the rentier economy of the Nigerian 
economy in which oil is the mainstay of the Nigerian economy resulting in prioritization of economic diplomacy 
over environmental diplomacy. There is over dependence or reliance on oil revenue due to non-diversification of 
the Nigerian economy which makes it difficult for Nigerian government to risk revenue loss that may result from 
rigid and radical gas flaring elimination measures. The point is that the place of oil in Nigerian economy makes 
it impossible for government to limit oil production to gas utilization capacity. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Oil as we noted remains the mainstay of Nigerian economy since 1970, fourteen years after its discovery in 
commercial quantity and twelve years after production. Indeed, the Nigerian crude oil is mixed with natural gas, 
and flaring of associated gas (AG) began with crude oil production. In other words, gas flaring is as old as crude 
oil production in Nigeria. The point is that gas flared in association with crude oil production began in Nigeria 
under the British Colonial Rule when Shell began oil production in 1958, and with increasing production of oil, 
the volume of gas flared in the process of oil production increased.  
Apart from economic and energy waste incurred from gas flaring, it has negative impacts on the 
environment and health. This is because flaring of associated gas emits a greenhouse gas (GHG) which 
contributes to global warming and climate change. Although the environmental effects of gas flaring is 
transboundary or global in terms of global warming and climate change, it has some negative effects on the 
immediate and local environment with serious health, agricultural and even economic implications. 
We noted that in spite of all these efforts by Nigerian government, oil multinationals in joint ventures 
with NNPC continues to flare gas in oil fields, and there is nothing on the ground to suggest that they will end 
gas flaring soon. For example, Table 1 above shows that Nigerian government has been able to reduce gas flaring 
in relative terms but not in absolute terms. Also, Appendix V below indicates that Nigeria still rank second in the 
gas flaring globally. In other words, the government has been setting new deadlines every year to completely 
stop flaring to no avail. Due to rentier character of the Nigerian state, rentier mentality of the Nigerian rentier 
(ruling) class and rentierism of the Nigerian economy, the government has not been successful in enforcing these 
deadlines on oil multinationals. This is largely because the Nigerian government has not been completely 
committed and sincere in ensuring compliance by oil multinationals for fear of losing oil revenues, a case of 
failure of environmental diplomacy. Indeed there is a tension between economic diplomacy and environmental 
diplomacy. A serious government would have pegged oil production to the capacity of gas utilization even if it 
means reduction in oil production and loss of revenues. Thus, Aghalino (2009) states that it is puzzling that in 
spite of the measures that have been taken by the Nigerian government to stop gas flaring, oil firms continue to 
flare gas in its various oil fields in Nigeria.  
Given the rentier character of the Nigerian state, the fundamental thing to do is to diversify the revenue 
base of the economy to reduce the excessive dependence on oil revenue by mainstreaming other domestic 
sources of revenue like direct tax as well as developing other sectors of the economy like manufacturing sector. 
This is a fundamental and far reaching solution to increasing the ability or political and economic will of 
enforcing zero-gas flaring regime in Nigeria. 
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Table 1: Total Gas Produced and Flared (mscf) 2001-2011 
Year Gas Produced Gas Flared Percentage Gas Flared 
2001 1,822,922,111 920,905,671 50.52 
2002 1,651,591,488 744,108,036 45.65 
2003 1,830,302,769 847,614,682 46.31 
2004 2,082,283,189 886,070,555 42.55 
2005 2,093,628,859 812,332,777 38.80 
2006 2,182,432,084 799,998,369 36.66 
2007 2,140,274,706 659,368,435 30.81 
2008 2,282,440,395 617,618,876 27.06 
2009 1,837,278,307 509,351,905 27.72 
2010 2,392,838,898 581,568,354 24.30 
2011 2,400,402,880 619,032,858 25.79 
Source: NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2010 and 2011. 
 
Table 2: Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to Nigeria  





8 To complement LEEMP in financing biodiversity management and 









10 Second National Fadama Development Critical Ecosystem 
Management Project 
June 29, 2010 4.5 Lagos  Urban Transport Project II 
July 08, 2010 6.8 Nigeria Scaling Up Sustainable Land Management Practice, 
Knowledge and Coordination  
Source: World Bank Statistics, 2011. 
 
Table 3: World Bank Credit Facilities to Nigeria  
Date Project Name Credit Facilities in $ 
June 28, 2005 National Energy Development Project (NEDP) 172 
August 06, 2007 National Energy Development Project (Carbon Offset) 5.87 
June 09, 2008 NG-Lagos Landfill Gas and Composing (FYO6) 2.13 
June 16, 2009 Nigeria Electricity and Gas Improvement Project 
(NEGIP) 
200 
Source: World Bank Statistics, 2011. 
 
Table 4: GGFR’s Flaring Reduction Demonstration Project from Carbon Finance in Nigeria 





Eni Kwale Gas-to-Power 1,513 10,540 Registered AM0009 
Shell Afam Gas-to-Power 740 3,700 Method 
submitted  
NM 
Eni ObOb Gas to 
Reinjection 
2,000 10,000 On hold  NM 
Source: GGFR-CFFS Committee Workshop, GGFR Brief, April 25, 2007. 
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Table 5: Nigeria’s Estimated Flared Volumes (in bcm) from Satellite Data, 2002-2011 
Year F14 F15 F16 F18 Average 
2002 21.1 21.0 - - 21.0 
2003 23.1 24.6 - - 23.8 
2004 - 21.9 23.4 - 22.6 
2005 - 20.0 22.5 - 21.3 
2006 - 17.6 19.7 - 18.6 
2007 - 15.5 17.0 - 16.3 
2008 - - 15.5 - 15.5 
2009 - - 14.9 - 14.9 
2010 - - - 15.2 15.0 
2011 - - - - 14.6 
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Satellite Data, 2012. 
 
APPENDIX I 
GAS PRODUCED AND FLARED FROM 1958 to 1994 
Year Gas production (Mm3) Gas Flared (Mm3) 
1958 46 - 
1959 1.40 - 
1960 144 - 
1961 310 - 
1962 487 - 
1963 626 - 
1964 1,029 - 
1965 2,250 - 
1966 2,907 - 
1967 2,634 - 
1968 1,462 - 
1969 4,126 - 
1970 8,039 7,957 
1971 12,975 12,790 
1972 17,122 16,848 
1973 21,882 21,487 
1974 27,170 26,776 
1975 18,656 18,333 
1976 21,276 20,617 
1977 21,924 20,952 
1978 21,306 19,440 
1979 27,618 26,073 
1980 24,885 22,904 
1981 17,202 14,162 
1982 14,830 11,940 
1983 15,207 11,948 
1984 16,251 12,817 
1985 18,426 14,846 
1986 17,900 13,917 
1987 15,580 12,291 
1988 20,212 14,737 
1989 26,300 18,730 
1990 28,163 21,820 
1991 31,587 25,934 
1992 32,465 24,588 
1993 33,445 25,406 
1994 33,928 25,934 
Source: Nigeria Delta Environmental Survey (NDES), Socio-Economic Characteristics Volume 11996 culled 
from Aghalino, S.O. (2009) “Gas Flaring, Environmental Pollution and Abatement Measures in Nigeria, 
1969-2001”, Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 11 (4): 219-238. 
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MONETARY VALUE OF GAS PRODUCED, UTILIZED AND FLARED (N BILLION), 1961-
1998 
Year Gas Produced Gas Utilized Gas Flared Gas Flare 
Penalty 
1961 8.79 - - - 
1962 13.78 - - - 
1963 17.75 - - - 
1964 29.17 - - - 
1965 98.08 - 94.68 - 
1966 100.11 7.44 9.27 - 
1967 189.89 7.23 182.53 - 
1968 105.40 10.89 94.51 - 
1969 297.44 4.61 292.82 - 
1970 587.62 8.00 573.03 - 
1971 936.89 14.85 922.62 - 
1972 1234.33 19.75 1214.75 - 
1973 2030.31 36.80 2001.52 - 
1974 2530.89 36.70 2494.18 - 
1975 1737.91 30.09 1707.72 - 
1976 1981.67 61.20 1920.48 - 
1977 2032.07 80.79 1951.68 - 
1978 1908.27 97.44 1810.84 - 
1979 2556.67 178.59 3379.06 - 
1980 2286.93 302.88 2878.93 - 
1981 1594.08 472.13 1745.71 - 
1982 1993.51 320.62 1547.42 - 
1983 1415.14 420.42 1548.46 - 
1984 2106.13 445.57 1660.57 2526.60 
1985 2406.54 602.25 1804.29 2745.34 
1986 2428.45 624.80 1803.65 2744.36 
1987 2225.23 644.89 1580.34 2404.59 
1988 3280.50 892.02 2387.88 296.65 
1989 4070.25 1021.09 3043.01 3704.10 
1990 10234.80 1950.48 7260.84 4419.13 
1991 25482.60 5508.00 19974.60 4802.82 
1992 25988.04 6081.48 19905.76 24230.29 
1993 27280.80 6407.10 20873.70 25402.51 
1994 27280.30 5483.70 21797.10 26532.52 
1995 28431.00 6572.34 21858.66 26607.45 
1996 57429.00 14353.20 43075.80 20217.01 
1997 60183.00 16820.48 39259.08 23894.06 
1998 57888.44 17636.12 40743.00 49594.51 
Source: Culled from Okoh (2001) in Aghalino, S.O. (2009) “Gas Flaring, Environmental Pollution and 
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NIGERIAN NATURAL GAS AND DISPOSAL, 1961-2009 (MILLION CUBIC METRES) 
Year Gas Produced Gas Utilized Gas Flared 
1961 310.00 N/A N/A 
1962 486.00 N/A N/A 
1963 626.00 N/A N/A 
1964 1,029.00 N/A N/A 
1965 2,849.00 116.00 2,733.00 
1966 2,908.00 216.00 2,692.00 
1967 2,634.00 102.00 2,532.00 
1968 1,462.00 151.00 1,311.00 
1969 4,126.00 64.00 4,062.00 
1970 8,068.00 111.00 7,957.00 
1971 12,996.00 206.00 12,790.00 
1972 17,122.00 274.00 16,848.00 
1973 21,882.00 395.00 21,487.00 
1974 27,170.00 394.00 26,776.00 
1975 18,656.00 323.00 18,333.00 
1976 21,274.00 657.00 20,617.00 
1977 21,815.00 863.00 20,952.00 
1978 20,486.00 1,046.00 19,440.00 
1979 27,450.00 1,378.00 26,073.00 
1980 24,551.00 2,337.00 22,214.00 
1981 17,113.00 3,643.00 13,470.00 
1982 15,382.00 3,442.00 11,940.00 
1983 15,192.00 3,244.00 11,948.00 
1984 16,251.00 3,438.00 12,813.00 
1985 18,569.00 4,647.00 13,922.00 
1986 18,738.00 4,821.00 13,917.00 
1987 17,170.00 4,976.00 12,194.00 
1988 20,250.00 5,510.00 14,740.00 
1989 25,129.00 6,303.00 18,784.00 
1990 28,430.00 6,020.00 22,410.00 
1991 31,460.00 6,800.00 24,660.00 
1992 32,084.00 7,508.00 24,575.00 
1993 33,680.00 7,910.00 25,770.00 
1994 33,680.00 6,770.00 26,910.00 
1995 35,100.00 8,114.00 26,986.00 
1996 35,450.00 8,860.00 26,590.00 
1997 37,150.00 10,383.00 24,234.00 
1998 37,039.00 13,407.00 23,632.00 
1999 43,636.00 21,274.00 22,362.00 
2000 42,732.00 18,477.00 24,255.00 
2001 52,453.00 25,702.00 26,759.00 
2002 48,192.00 23,356.87 24,835.58 
2003 51,766.03 27,823.00 23,943.03 
2004 58,963.61 33,881.68 25,090.91 
2005 59,284.97 36,282.27 23,002.71 
2006 82,063.86 53,479.47 28,584.39 
2007 84,707.34 57,400.21 27,307.13 
2008 80,603.61 58,792.61 21,811.00 
2009 64,882.86 46,895.27 17,987.59 
Total 1,375,052.74 480,898.10 824,262.75 
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SUMMARY OF GAS PROJECTS IN NIGERIA 





Oso Phase II NGL and LPG MPN 600 600 800 
Gas-to-Liquid (G-
to-L) 
Synthetic fuel ChevronTexaco 300 300 1,200 
Escravos Gas Plant NGL and LPG ChevronTexaco Phase I-165 
Phase II-135 
Phase III-400 
Total – 700 
700 550-1000 
Belema Project Gas Re-injection Shell 80 80 N/A 











20 20 35 
Ota/Agbara and 





 N/A 35 

















Phase 1,2 and 3 











 N/A 2,500 
Elf Gas Company  Gas Gathering Elf  N/A 400 
Lagos Emer-Power 
Purchase2  
Power Generation AES Corporation  Supply 270MW N/A 800 
ABB-IPP Power Generation ABB Group Phase 1, 2 and 3-
300MW 
N/A N/A 
Source: Centre for Energy Economics (CEE) (nd) Gas Monetization in Nigeria.  
1Train 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 have been completed remaining Train 7. 




Civil and Environmental Research                                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5790 (Paper) ISSN 2225-0514 (Online) 




WORLD BANK ESTIMATED TOP TWENTY GAS FLARING COUNTRIES (109 CUBIC 
METRE) 
Rank Country 2005 2006 20071 Approximate CO2 Emissions from 
Flaring (106 tonnes/year) for 20063 
1 Russia2 55.2 48.8 50.0 116.4 
2 Nigeria2 21.3 19.3 16.8 46.0 
3 Iran2 11.3 12.1 10.6 28.9 
4 Iraq2 7.1 7.4 7.0 17.7 
5 Kazakhstan  5.8 6.0 5.3 14.3 
6 Algeria2 5.2 6.2 5.2 14.8 
7 Libya  4.4 4.3 3.7 10.3 
8 Angola  4.6 4.0 3.5 9.5 
9 Saudi Arabia 3.0 3.3 3.4 7.9 
10 Qatar2 2.7 2.8 2.9 6.7 
11 China  2.8 2.8 2.5 6.7 
12 Indonesia2  2.7 3.0 2.4 7.2 
13 Kuwait  2.5 2.5 2.1 6.0 
14 Venezuela  2.1 2.0 2.1 4.8 
15 Uzbekistan  2.5 2.8 2.0 6.7 
16 United States2 2.0 1.9 1.9 4.5 
17 Oman  2.5 2.2 1.9 5.2 
18 Mexico2 0.9 1.2 1.7 2.9 
19 Malaysia  1.7 1.8 1.7 4.3 
20 Gabon2 2.2 1.9 1.6 4.3 
 Total 142 136 128 325.2 
 Gas Flaring Level 162 157 147 374.5 
Source: http://go.worldbank.org/G20AW2DKZ0 in International Petroleum Industry Environmental 
Conservation Association (IPIECA), October 2009.  
1Ranking are based on 2007 data.  
2GGFR countries.  
3CO2 emissions have been estimated using API compendium default natural gas higher heating 
value of 1235Btu/P.E. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
